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Final-Offer Arbitration and 
Public-Safety Employees: The 
Massachusetts Experience* 
DAVID B. LIPSKY 
Cornell University 
T H O M A S A. BAROCCI 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Municipal employees in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts have 
had the statutory right to bargain over wages, hours, and other terms 
and conditions of employment since 1965.x The law was amended in 
1973 to allow for final-offer arbitration by package for police and fire-
fighter units. The final-offer arbitration amendments took effect on July 
1, 1974, and were scheduled to expire, after a three-year trial period, on 
June 30, 1977.2 Thus, during the spring of 1977 the debate on whether 
or not to extend the provisions of the law was lively and intense. Fire-
fighter and police unions were the main proponents of extension of the 
law, and organizations representing the city and town governments of 
the Commonwealth were the main opponents. 
Under the Massachusetts statute, organizations of uniformed officers 
* Funds for this study were provided by the Sloan School of Management, Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology. We would particularly like to thank Associate Dean 
Abraham J. Siegel for his support and advice. We would also like to thank Helaine 
Knickerbocker, chairman of the Massachusetts Board of Conciliation and Arbitra-
tion, and the staff of the Board for their cooperation. We also received the coopera-
tion and help of many employee and employer representatives and neutrals in 
Massachusetts, for which we are grateful. We would also like to thank Ethan Jacks, 
Peggy Taylor, Richard Fletcher, Bonnie Burate, Ed Gonzales, Paul Cornoyer, and 
William Suojanen for their research assistance. Author's address: Lipsky, NYSSILR, 
Cornell University, P.O. Box 1000, Ithaca, NY 14853. 
1
 Massachusetts public employees were granted the right to join unions and to 
present proposals to public employers in 1958 (Ch. 149, General Laws of Massachu-
setts). In 1964 the law was amended to allow state employees the right to bargain 
with respect to working conditions, but not wages. The following year all municipal 
employees were granted the right to bargain about wages, hours, and terms and 
conditions of employment (Chs. 150 and 150E, General Laws of Massachusetts). 
2
 Sec. 4, Ch. 1078, Acts of 1973. 
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could petition the State Board of Conciliation and Arbitration for final-
offer arbitration only if (1) the employee organization participated in 
negotiations, mediation, and fact-finding in good faith; (2) 30 days had 
passed since the publication of the fact-finder's report; (3) prohibited 
practices proceedings before the State Labor Relations Commission had 
been exhausted with respect to complaints filed before the date of the 
fact-finder's report; and (4) an impasse continued to exist. If these con-
ditions were met, the Board of Conciliation and Arbitration would then 
appoint a tripartite panel, which would conduct hearings. At the con-
clusion of the hearings, each side would submit its last best offer to the 
panel. The panel was required to pick either the entire last best offer of 
the union or the entire last best offer of the employer, and its selection 
would be final and binding upon the parties. 
In addition to Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, Michigan, New 
Jersey, and Wisconsin now use some form of final-offer arbitration to 
resolve police and fire disputes.3 Other states, including Alaska, New 
York, Pennsylvania, Minnesota, Nevada, Oregon, Rhode Island, Wash-
ington, and Wyoming, employ conventional arbitration to resolve police 
and fire disputes. 
The Debate on Final-Offer Arbitration 
The debate in Massachusetts in 1977 on the question of continuing 
final-offer arbitration is symptomatic of a nationwide concern to develop 
effective and equitable methods of resolving public-safety employee dis-
putes. Final-offer arbitration is a response to some of the criticisms of 
conventional arbitration. Under conventional arbitration, the arbitrator 
fashions his award from the various issues submitted to him for resolu-
tion. Usually his award is a compromise solution that does not hold 
entirely with either the position of the union or the position of the em-
ployer. It has often been observed that an arbitrator in "conventional" 
cases will "split the difference" between the final positions of the parties. 
For this reason, it has been widely held that the parties subject to con-
3
 Massachusetts and Wisconsin practice a "pure" form of final-offer arbitration 
whereby each party must submit one final package incorporating all outstanding 
issues and the arbitrator must select what he considers to be the more suitable pack-
age. Connecticut, Iowa, and Michigan adopted a variant of the concept allowing 
arbitrators to consider each outstanding issue separately and select from one or the 
other side's final positions on an issue-by-issue basis. Michigan further limits final-
offer arbitration to economic issues only. New Jersey adopted a statute in 1977 that 
permits the parties in public-safety disputes to choose any "terminal procedure" to 
resolve an impasse after fact-finding. Final-offer arbitration is one of the choices 
available to the parties. If the parties are unable to mutually agree on one pro-
cedure, the statute provides that final-offer arbitration by package shall be used to 
resolve economic issues and final-offer arbitration by issue shall be used to resolve 
noneconomic issues. 
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ventional arbitration withhold concessions during negotiations and pre-
sent extreme positions to the arbitrator. Consequently, it is argued that 
conventional arbitration has a "chilling effect" on negotiations, causing 
the parties to become more intransigent in their positions than they 
otherwise would be. 
Final-offer arbitration is designed, at least in theory, to overcome this 
defect. If either party adheres to an unreasonable position, it runs a high 
risk of losing the arbitration case to its bargaining opponent. Thus the 
parties no longer have an incentive to withhold concessions during 
negotiations. Rather, the Draconian nature of arbitral decision-making 
under this process should cause each party to assume a stance that will 
appear more reasonable than its opponent's to the arbitrator. If these 
assumptions about the dynamics of the process are correct, then final-
offer arbitration ought to decrease reliance on outside neutrals and lead 
to more voluntarily negotiated agreements.4 
The final-offer technique has been criticized, however, on several 
grounds. First inexperienced negotiators may not correctly perceive the 
risk involved in using final-offer arbitration and, if this is so, the pre-
sumed incentive to concede and compromise will not be present. Second, 
negotiators may perceive the risk, but may also be so convinced that 
their position is correct and just that they do not modify or compromise 
their stance in negotiations or the initial impasse steps. Third, arbi-
trators, for one reason or another, may not be able to discern the more 
"reasonable" of two offers and may select final offers that are not in the 
public interest. Fourth, under final-offer arbitration by package, a party 
may present a final offer that is eminently reasonable except for one 
so-called "sleeper" issue that is totally unacceptable to the other side or 
unreasonable by other standards. Thus, arbitrators can be confronted 
with the dilemma of choosing between two final packages, each of 
which may contain one or more unacceptable demands. In sum, final-
offer arbitration does not guarantee that awards made by arbitrators will 
necessarily meet tests of fairness and equity.5 
In addition to the potential problems pointed out in the preceding 
paragraph, critics of the law in Massachusetts contended that final-offer 
arbitration clearly favored the unions, had—contrary to the theory of 
the technique—actually stifled the bargaining process, and had resulted 
4
 Of the many discussions, see especially Carl M. Stevens, "Is Compulsory Arbitra-
tion Compatible with Bargaining?" Industrial Relations (February 1966), pp. 38 -51 ; 
Joseph R. Grodin, "Either-Or Arbitration for Public Employee Disputes," Industrial 
Relations (May 1972), pp. 260-66; and Peter Feuille, "Final Offer Arbitration and 
the Chilling Effect," Industrial Relations (October 1975), pp. 302-10. 
5
 See, for example, Charles Feigenbaum, "Final Offer Arbitration: Better Theory 
than Practice," Industrial Relations (October 1975), pp. 311-17. 
I 
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in inflationary wage settlements. They pointed to the fact that unions 
won approximately two-thirds of the cases going to final-offer arbitra-
tion in the commonwealth. Some of the critics were particularly sensitive 
to the statutory requirement that municipalities must fund an arbitration 
award, whereas the funding of settlements reached through negotiations 
or other impasse steps could be put to a vote by the elected representa-
tives of the town or city. Since arbitrated settlements were guaranteed 
funding, the critics contended that unions had little incentive to engage 
in meaningful preimpasse bargaining. Finally, the critics argued that 
the selection of the union's final position in a few well publicized, visible 
cases had created a high-wage pattern that other municipalities had 
been forced to follow even when their public-safety employee disputes 
had been resolved short of arbitration.6 
Supporters of final-offer arbitration denied that it resulted in infla-
tionary outcomes, claiming that salary settlements awarded in arbitration 
cases simply followed comparable settlements reached in other sectors 
of the economy. Furthermore, supporters argued that the statute's effec-
tiveness was evidenced by the fact that there had been no work stop-
pages by public-safety employees during the law's existence. Finally, 
they argued that the proportion of union "victories" could not be used 
to judge the fairness of the law, since such a "box score" takes no ac-
count of the quality of the offers made by the parties to the arbitrator.7 
In the remainder of this paper, we analyze the effect of final-offer 
arbitration on the process of police and firefighter bargaining in Massa-
chusetts, focusing particularly on whether the availability of final-offer 
arbitration created a "chilling effect" in public-safety disputes.8 
0
 Paul C. Somers, An Evaluation of Final Offer Arbitration in Massachusetts (Bos-
ton: Massachusetts League of Cities and Towns Personnel and Labor Relations Bul-
letin, November 1976). Mr. Somers is director, personnel/labor relations of the 
MLCT. As pointed out later in the text, the MLCT has been the major opponent of 
final-offer arbitration in Massachusetts. 
7
 Richard K. Sullivan, "Final Offer Arbitration: The Massachusetts Experience," 
printed by the International Brotherhood of Police Officers. Mr. Sullivan is counsel to 
the IBPO, one of the major organizations representing police officers in Massachu-
setts. 
8
 For another assessment of the Massachusetts law, see Interim Report of the Gov-
ernor's Task Force on Chapter 150E and Impasse Procedures, report submitted to 
Governor Michael S. Dukakis in September 1976. The Task Force, consisting of la-
bor, management, and neutral representatives, had little statistical evidence on which fj 
to base an evaluation and so concluded that it was "premature to properly evaluate^ 
the law's success." Nevertheless, the Task Force recommended that the final-offer 
law be extended for an additional two-year period. See also, Lawrence T. Holden, 
Jr., "Final Offer Arbitration in Massachusetts," Arbitration Journal (March 1976), 
pp. 26-35. Mr. Holden was chairman of the Massachusetts Board of Conciliation 
and Arbitration for three years, until 1975. 
PUBLIC SECTOR 69 
Final-Offer Arbitration and the "Chilling Effect" 
Exhaustive data gathered from the files of the Massachusetts Board 
of Conciliation and Arbitration allow us to trace the use of impasse 
procedures in police and fire negotiations over the period from fiscal year 
1972 to December 31, 1976, of fiscal year 1977. Information was also 
gathered on the incidence of impasse in teacher negotiations in order 
to allow some comparisons to be made between groups of Massachusetts 
public employees that bargain with and without final-offer arbitration 
as the final step.9 
When these data were broken down into two periods—encompassing 
the three fiscal years preceding the date that the final-offer arbitration 
amendments took eflFect and the two and one-half years that elapsed 
from the date of the new law to December 31, 1976—we found that the 
number of impasses declared in police, fire, and teacher negotiations 
increased from 371 in the prelaw period to 630 in the postlaw period; 
this is an increase of nearly 70 percent. Most of this increase, however, is 
accounted for by a higher incidence of impasse in police and fire negotia-
tions. The highest percentage increase in impasses occurred in firefighter 
bargaining; in the prelaw period there were 61 impasses, while in the 
postlaw period there were 157 impasses, an increase of 157 percent. 
Police impasses increased from 107 in the prelaw period to 198 in the 
postlaw period, an increase of 85 percent. By contrast, teacher negotia-
tions resulted in impasses in 202 cases in the prelaw period and 272 
cases in the postlaw period, an increase of 33 percent. Thus, this first 
level of analysis certainly does not indicate that final-offer arbitration 
promoted the settlement of police and fire disputes without the use of 
third-party neutrals. 
Our second test of the existence of a "chilling effect" involved calcu-
lating the proportion of police and fire negotiations that resulted in im-
passe. As shown in Table 1, we found that the proportion of police and 
fire impasses increased from 28 percent in the last prelaw year to over 
53 percent in the first year under final-offer arbitration. In the second 
year of the law, however, the proportion decreased to 42 percent. Cau-
tion must be used in concluding that this test demonstrates the existence 
i of a "chilling effect." Clearly, many factors determine whether or not 
H • We also gathered information on police and firefighter salaries and fringe benefits 
ptnd have analyzed whether final-offer arbitration had an "inflationary" impact on 
{public-safety salaries and fringes. Preliminary estimates of the economic impact of 
: the Massachusetts law are contained in David B. Lipsky and Thomas A. Barocci, 
The Impact of Final Offer Arbitration in Massachusetts: An Analysis of Police and 
Firefighter Collective Bargaining," Working Paper 941-77, Alfred P. Sloan School 
of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, May 1977. 
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TABLE 1 
Proportion of Police and Fire Negotiations Resulting in Impasse 
in Massachusetts, FY1972-FY1976 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
Police and Fire 
Negotiations 
203 
237 
249 
267 
281 
Impasses 
39 
60 
70 
143 
121 
Proportion Resulting 
in Impasse 
19.2% 
25.3% 
28.1% 
53.6% 
42.1% 
/Source: For the number of police and fire negotiations, Somers, An Evaluation 
of Final Offer Arbitration, p. xviii. 
the parties will declare impasse. Certainly the bargaining environment 
of 1975-76 was different from that of 1972-74. The combination of tight-
ening constraints on municipal finances, significant increases in unem-
ployment in Massachusetts because of the recession that began in 1974, 
and higher rates of inflation probably made negotiated settlements more 
difficult to achieve in 1975-76 than they had been in earlier years. Still, 
it is likely that some part of the increase in the proportion of police and 
fire impasses can be attributed to the availability of arbitration in 1975-
76. 
A third test of the "chilling effect" of final-offer arbitration is based 
not on the total number of cases going to impasse, but on the number 
that actually ended with a final-offer award. Our evidence indicates that 
37 final-offer awards were issued in the first two and one-half years of 
the law. In fiscal 1975, less than 9 percent of police and fire units in-
volved in negotiations resorted to arbitration; in 1976 this proportion 
dropped to less than 2 percent. In other words, over the first two years 
of the law 93 percent of those municipalities that negotiated new police 
Pand fire contracts did so without relying upon arbitration. Thus it ap-
' pears that final-offer arbitration in Massachusetts may have led to greater 
reliance on impasse procedures in police and fire negotiations, but clearly 
I did not lead to a large number of cases being settled by arbitration itself. 
What impact did final-offer arbitration have on the effectiveness of 
mediation and fact-finding in resolving public safety disputes? Table 2 
provides information on the stage of settlement for the prelaw (1972-74) 
and postlaw (1975-77) periods. It is clear from this table that the rela-
tive proportion of cases settled through mediation declined in the post- i 
law period: about 60 percent of police and fire impasses were settled in* 
mediation in 1972-74, compared to 33 percent in 1975-77. By the same; 
token, however, the proportion of mediated teacher cases also declined, 
from 78.5 percent of impasse cases in 1972-74 to 44.5 percent in 1975-77. 
TABLE 2 
Stage of Settlement by Unit, Before and After the Massachusetts Final-Offer Arbitration Law 
Stage of Settlement 
Withdrawn 
Mediation 
During fact-finding 
Following fact-finder's 
report 
In arbitration 
Following arbitration award 
Remand to parties 
Others 
Total 
Pending 
Police 
No. 
5 
64 
13 
19 
2 
103 
Pet. 
4 .9 
62.1 
12.6 
18.4 
1.9 
100.0 
FY1972-74 
Fire 
No. 
2 
32 
4 
15 
1 
54 
Pet. 
3.7 
59.3 
7.4 
27.8 
1.8 
100.0 
Teachers 
No. 
6 
157 
16 
20 
1 
200 
Pet. 
3.0 
78.5 
8.0 
10.0 
0.5 
100.0 
Police 
No. 
14 
56 
26 
29 
10 
16 
151 
47 
Pet. 
9.3 
37.1 
17.2 
19.2 
6.6 
10.6 
100.0 
FY1975-77 
Fire 
No. 
7 
35 
19 
15 
17 
21 
1 
115 
42 
Pet. 
6.1 
30.4 
16.5 
13.0 
14.8 
18.3 
0.9 
100.0 
Teachers 
No. 
71 
101 
34 
21 
— 
— 
— 
227 
45 
Pet. 
31.3 
44.5 
15.0 
9.2 
— 
— 
— 
100.0 
h3 
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Therefore, it is difficult to say to what extent one can attribute the ap-
parent decline in the effectiveness of mediation in public-safety disputes 
to the availability of arbitration as a final step in the procedure. Staff 
''mediators on the Board of Conciliation and Arbitration, in interviews 
with the authors, were nearly unanimous in believing that they became 
less effective in achieving settlements after the arbitration statute was 
\ passed, but surely the deteriorating economic environment of the post-
\ law period had some impact on their effectiveness. 
r-"' The data in Table 2 give some support to the proposition that fact-
A finding retained its viability as a dispute-settlement technique after the 
[^adoption of final-offer arbitration. Before the law, about one-third of 
public safety impasses were resolved during fact-finding or immediately 
following the issuance of the fact-finder's report; a slightly higher pro-
portion (and a much larger number of impasses) were settled in this 
manner after passage of the law. Moreover, another 10 percent of the 
impasses were settled "in arbitration," but short of the issuance of an 
arbitration award; in these cases either the parties reached a settlement 
on their own or the arbitrator successfully mediated an agreement. These 
data, however, do not completely convey the critical importance of fact-
finding under final-offer arbitration. Examination of the final-offer awards 
showed that in all but a few cases the arbitrator selected the final-offer 
package that came closest to (or was identical to) the fact-finder's formal 
recommendations.10 Of all the statutory criteria that the arbitrator is 
instructed to apply in final-offer cases, the fact-finder's report clearly 
appears to have been the most compelling to arbitrators. It is not an 
I overstatement to say that, with rare exceptions; p Massachusetts final-
ffer awards were in fact determined during the fact-finding process. 
i n 
IM 
Impact of Arbitration on the Process of Bargaining: 
Comparisons with Other States 
The negotiating experience of police and fire units in Massachusetts 
can be compared with experiences in other jurisdictions where either 
final-offer or conventional arbitration has been made available to the 
parties. Table 3 summarizes the impasse experience and arbitration 
usage in six states for which data are available. What is clearly apparent 
10
 Holden, who looked at the Massachusetts experience after one year, believed 
that "fact-finding has become in reality the cornerstone of the entire impasse pro-
cedure. For those disputes that are not going to get resolved at the bargaining table, 
fact-finding is where the concrete for the foundation of an arbitration award is first 
poured. It is very difficult to recast the foundation once it has been laid since one 
party or the other will normally adopt the fact-finder's recommendations as its last, 
best offer." Holden, pp. 28-29. We found that the arbitration award differed sig-
nificantly from the fact-finder's recommendation in only five or six cases. 
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in the table is the marked contrast between the relative use of arbitra-
tion in states using the final-offer form and the relative use in states 
using the conventional form. On the one hand, less than 7 percent of 
the negotiations subject to final-offer arbitration in Iowa and Massachu-
setts ended with the issuance of an award in the years surveyed. On 
the other hand, in Pennsylvania and New York where conventional ar-
bitration is employed, 29 or 30 percent of police and fire negotiations 
ended with the issuance of an arbitration award. In Michigan, where 
final-offer arbitration by issue is used, 16.3 percent of negotiations ended 
with an arbitration award. In Wisconsin, which uses final-offer arbitra-
tion by package, 10.4 percent of negotiations ended with an arbitration 
award in the first two years of the statute's existence, but this proportion 
increased to 13-15 percent in the following two years. The award rate 
also seems to have increased over time in Michigan, but the six years 
of experience recorded for Pennsylvania show no strong trend in arbitra^. 
tion usage one way or the other.11 Although the data are incomplete, 
there is also some evidence in Table 3 that final-offer arbitration by 
package is related to a lower incidence of impasse in negotiations than 
either final-offer by issue or conventional arbitration. This result is, of 
course, consistent with the "theory" of final-offer arbitration. '—""^  
In sum, the comparisons presented in Table 3 should give some com-
fort to the supporters of final-offer arbitration. The prediction that the 
parries would be more likely to reach agreement on their own and rely 
less on arbitration if the final-offer form rather than the conventional 
form were used seems to be borne out by these data. Several caveats 
; need to be mentioned, however. First, rates of usage of impasse pro-
cedures and arbitration are dependent on the precise structure of the 
{ impasse procedures, on the way these procedures are administered 
f within the state, and on the acceptability of the procedures to the parties. 
I No attempt can be made here to compare such factors across the states 
I listed in Table 3. Second, rates of impasse and arbitration usage are 
I probably also affected both by the precise nature of the relationships 
| between the parties and by the environment in which they bargain. 
I Kochan and his colleagues, for example, found that the level of hostility 
; in the bargaining relationship, the size of the city, the extent to which 
i" 
k 
f uJames L. Stern, et al., Final-Offer Arbitration (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath 
Fund Co., 1975), pp. 13-16, 86-89; Thomas A. Kochan, et al., An Evaluation of 7m-
\passe Procedures for Police and Firefighters in New York State (Ithaca, N.Y.: N.Y.S. 
s School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1977), pp. 32-51; 
f. Peter Feuille, "Final Offer Arbitration and Negotiating Behaviors," paper presented 
l at the Fourth Annual Meeting of the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, 
; October 1976. 
' • 
; 
r 
TABLE 3 
Comparison of Impasse Experience and Arbitration Usage in Massachusetts with Other States Having Arbitration Statutes 
State Years 
Type of 
Arbitration 
No. of 
Negotiations 
No. of 
Impasses 
Impasses as 
%of 
Negotiations 
No. of 
Arbitration 
Awards 
Arbitration 
Awards as % 
Negotiations 
Iowa 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
New York 
Pennsylvania 
Wisconsin 
1975-10/197< 
1975-76 
1973-76 
1974-76 
1969-74 
1973-74 
1974-76 
3 Final-offer by 
issue 
Final-offer by 
package 
Final-offer by 
issue 
Conventional 
Conventional 
Final-offer by 
package 
Final-offer by 
package 
372 
548 
540 
118 
276 
249 
260-300 
255 
264 
NA 
78 
NA 
86 
144 
68.6 
48.2 
NA 
66.1 
NA 
34.5 
48.0-55.4 
25 
36 
34 
83 
26 
38 
6.7 
6.6 
16.3 
28.8 
30.1 
10.4 
12.7-14.6 
Sources: Iowa: Peter Feuille, "Final Offer Arbitration and Negotiation Behaviors," paper presented at the Fourth Annual 
Meeting of the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution. The Iowa statute applies to all municipal employees, not just police 
and firefighters. Police and fire experience is not separated out in these data. Wisconsin (1973-74) and Pennsylvania: James L. Stern, 
et al., Final-Offer Arbitration (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co., 1975), pp. 13-16, 86-89. Michigan, New York, Wisconsin 
(1974-76): Thomas A. Kochan, et al., An Evaluation of Impasse Procedures for Police and Firefighters in New York State (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
N.Y.S. School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1977), pp. 32-51. 
Notes: NA = not available or not applicable. Impasse data short of arbitration are not available for Michigan. The Michigan 
statute requires the parties to petition for mediation 30 calendar days prior to requesting arbitration (Stern, et al., pp. 44, 51). The 
Pennsylvania statute does not require mediation or fact-finding prior to arbitration (Stern, et al., pp. 8-12.) The Pennsylvania and 
New York data are based on samples of municipalities. Data for the other states are based on (more or less) complete counts. The 
Massachusetts data for 1975-76 exclude the fiscal 1977 data reported in Table 2. The Michigan and Wisconsin data include police and 
fire cases, but exclude data for deputy sheriffs, who are also subject to final-offer arbitration in these two states. 
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the union employed pressure tactics in negotiations, and the use of 
outside negotiators all ranked ahead of the nature of the impasse pro-
cedures in determining the stage of settlement of disputes in New York.12 
Again, the importance of such variables cannot be controlled in the 
comparisons made in Table 3. Third, the experience in Wisconsin and 
Michigan indicates that over time the parties may come to lean more 
heavily on the use of arbitration, that a "narcotic effect" may develop 
with the passage of time, even under final-offer arbitration. There has 
not been enough experience in Massachusetts, Iowa, or elsewhere to 
know whether this is an inevitable tendency. Finally, there is neither 
enough data nor sufficient controls to conclude on the basis of Table 3 
that final-offer arbitration by package clearly does promote voluntary 
settlements and reduce reliance on impasse procedures. Although the 
data in Table 3 are encouraging in that respect, it should be recalled 
that the rate of impasse usage in Massachusetts was significantly higher 
under final-offer arbitration than it had been under fact-finding. 
We conclude that, in terms of its impact on the bargaining process, 
final-offer arbitration has had a mixed record in Massachusetts. On the 
one hand, the law must probably be given some credit for preventing 
police and firefighter strikes; in addition, the rate of arbitration usage was 
remarkably low compared to experience in other states. On the other 
hand, the law probably led to more impasses in police and fire bargain-
ing (although the experience in the commonwealth was still favorable 
compared to other states) and reduced the effectiveness of the media-
tion stage of the impasse procedures. Perhaps most important, the law 
failed to gain acceptance with municipal employers in the common-
wealth. 
; 
Policy Epilogue 
In June 1977, the Massachusetts legislature passed, over the gov-
ernor's veto, a two-year extension of a revised version of the final-offer 
arbitration statute. The following important revisions were made in the 
statute: (1) the parties by their own agreement may now waive the 
fact-finding step; (2) if fact-finding is not waived, the arbitrator may 
select the fact-finder's recommendations instead of either side's final 
offer; (3) the parties by their own agreement may choose a single arbi-
trator rather than a tripartite panel, and, finally, (4) the scope of ar-
bitral issues was reduced and now excludes appointments, promotions, 
most work assignments, most transfers, and minimum manning require-
ments on shifts. 
12
 Kochan, et al., pp. 51-96. 
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Extension of the law did not end the battle, however. In the after-
math of the legislative override of the governor's veto, the main organiza-
tion opposing the law, the Massachusetts League of Cities and Towns, 
announced its intention to place the final-offer arbitration question on 
the ballot in the 1978 state elections. This move apparently prompted 
the police and firefighter unions to enter into discussions with the 
League in an effort to avoid a referendum on the issue. With the assis-
tance of Professsor John Dunlop, the parties reached a compromise 
agreement on a set of recommended amendments to the statute and 
submitted their recommendations to the legislature for consideration. The 
legislature accepted the recommendations and in November 1977 created 
a joint labor-management committee, consisting of six public-safety 
employee representatives, six municipal employer representatives, and 
an impartial chairman, all appointed by the governor, and empowered 
it to intervene at its own discretion in any police or fire dispute at any 
stage prior to arbitration. The committee has broad authority to act in 
the cases over which it assumes jurisdiction and can, for example, order 
the parties to continue bargaining, attempt to mediate a settlement of 
the case, order conventional arbitration, or allow the case to go forward 
under the regular statutory procedures to final-offer arbitration. The 
committee will be chaired by Professor Dunlop and will begin to operate 
in January 1978. Of course, it remains to be seen what impact this new 
approach will have on the process of public-safety employee bargaining 
in Massachusetts.13 
13
 Commonwealth of Massachusetts, "An Act Establishing a Joint Labor-Manage-
ment Committee to Oversee Municipal Police and Firefighter Collective Bargaining 
and Arbitration Proceedings," November 21, 1977 (Ch. 345, Sec. 2, Acts of 1977). 
The provision expires on June 30, 1979. Both the public-safety unions and the munic-
ipalities credit Professor John Dunlop with providing the means to achieve a com-
promise agreement. See the discussion in BNA, Government Employee Relations Re-
port, No. 739, December 19, 1977, pp. 16-20. 
